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1. FINANCIAL DISTRESS OF THE MEIJI 
GOVERNMENT 
"The Imperial regime has been at last restored; the 
fundamental policy of the State has been duly established; 
the Emperor will hereafter administer State affairs in person; 
and all things pertaining to the State are about to be pro·· 
vided. But there is one thing lacking-State revenue. Thi~ 
is due to the fact that Keiki Tokugawa (",)lilll!'!!'l has not 
yet transferred to the new Government the State revenue 
which he should have transferred at the time he gave up 
the political power in favour of the new Government, 
Although the Imperial Court has to defray various expenses 
for the disposition of State affairs, it has no source of 
revenue at its command". 
The above is a quotation from a public declaration 
issued by the Council of State on May 8, the first year of 
Meiji (1868). It clearly indicates the extreme financial dis· 
tress to which the Meiji Government was subjected at the 
beginning of its existence. 
Reviewing the series of· momentous events that took 
place at that time, one will find that it was on October 14, 
the third year of Keio (1867) that Keiki Tokugawa addressed 
a memorial to the Throne requesting Imperial permission 
to transfer the political power to the Imperial Court. The 
permission asked was granted on the very following day, 
namely, May 15, and a public declaration of the Restoration 
of the Imperial regime was made on December 14, the same 
year. But even at that time Keiki was still occupying the 
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official position of Naidaijin or Prime Minister, and still held 
his domain; while the daimyos, shrines and temples likewise 
held their respective fiefs. The newly formed Meiji Govern-
ment enjoyed a very feeble existence, as its only source of 
revenue was a domain which annually yielded 30,000 koku 
of rice and which the Imperial Court had heJd in possession 
during the feudal period. It was obvious that such a negli-
gible amount of revenue was utterly insufficient for the 
administration of the new Government. Truly," there was 
one thing lacking-State revenue ". 
The financial distress of the Meiji Government at that 
stage of its existence can never be adequately· imagined. 
Tomomi Iwakura (i6$rJ!,iill) urged the priests of temples such 
as the Higashi Hongwanji and the Nishi Hongwanji to make 
m<;lnetary contributions to the Government. He also in-
structed the leading merchants of Kyoto such as Saburosuke 
Mitsui ("'.~f"'.~UIJ), Zensuke Ono (+llf'ii'llIJ), and Hachiroemon 
Shimada (,l\\~i\~I1iflir') to do likewise. He also ordered 
Kyuemon Kumagai (n~~R1iflir') (the then proprietor of the 
Kyukyodo '.!lJll>t) to urge wealthy merchants and landowners 
of Kyoto and its vicinity to lend their financial assistance 
to the Imperial Government. On December 26, the Revenue 
Office gave out the following instruction to the Mitsui· 
gumi: 
"Now that the Shogunate Government has returned the 
political power to the Imperial Court and the Shogun him-
self has withdrawn to Osaka Castle, all government orders 
shall hereafter be issued by the Imperial Court. However, 
as the transfer of revenue affairs has not yet been made by 
the Shogunate Government, the Imperial Court is confronted 
by financial want. Accordingly, the Revenue Office has 
been established for the purpose of securing the necessary 
State revenue. Indications at present are that hostilities 
may be commenced at any moment between the Imperial 
Court and the Shogunate, and we are constrained to secure 
revenue for the general administration of State affairs and 
conducting military campaigns in order to maintain peace 
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in the realm. Now, as your firm has been in the financial 
service to the Imperial Court from the olden t.ime, you are 
ordered to be in service of the Revenue Office hereafter. 
Consider the gravity of the present condition of the Imperial 
Court and serve it with all your fidelity". 
Mitsui·gumi responded to this order with promptitude 
and made a donation of 1,000 ryo. The same firm also 
presented 1,000 ryo to the army of the Satsuma Clan 
quartered at the Sokokuji, Kyoto, and which was faced by 
a serious financial want with its resulting blow to the morale 
of the soldiers. This forced loan or contribution was made 
on the eve of the Fushimi·Toba Battle that really heralded 
the open hostilities of the Imperial Court and the crumbling 
Shogunate. In January, next year, Mitsui·gumi together. 
with the two families of Ono and Shimada made a loan of 
2,000 ryo to the new Government. 
There were other instances of such loans. The transfer 
of the political power by the Shogunate placed a heavy 
financial burden on the new Government and the burden 
was further increased in weight by the Battle of Fushimi·. 
Toba. As the Government had no permanent source of· 
revenue, it inevitably depended on the donations and loans 
by wealthy commoners in the disposition of its immediate 
problems. 
2. FORCED LOANS DURING THE EARLY 
STAGE OF MEUI 
The Revenue Office was established on December 23, 1867 
and Samon Hayashi (**tr:r,) and Hachiro Mitsuoka (Kimmasa 
Yuri) (=:r:uIi\~~, ilHU&>JE) were appointed as its directors, and 
charged with the duty of securing revenue for the Govern· 
ment. Mitsui·gumi was represented by several of its own 
men at the Revenue Office. These men carried out the 
financial work. They often found it impossible to make 
both ends meet, and the Mitsui·gumi had to make up the 
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statement made under date of January 15, 1868, Mitsui, 
together with Ono and Shimada, filled the financial require-
ments of the Government by accomodating loans out of the 
bills of exchange which people had drawn with these three 
financial houses on their credit_ There was a persistent 
danger of an over-imposition of forced loans resulting in a 
stoppage of the payment of the bills and thus in a loss of 
confidence in the credit power of these houses-which loss 
would have prevented them from further serving the Revenue 
Office_ Accordingly, on January 17, the same year, the 
Revenue Office issued a statement saying that funds given 
to the Government were to be regarded as loans and would 
not be therefore confiscated (as was often done under the 
old regime) and that the payment of bills of exchange in 
big sums might be suspended at the convenience of the 
Government_ On January 19, a loan of 10,000 ryo was 
made jointly by Mitsui, Ono and Shimada_ 
Thus, the forced loans extended by these three financial 
houses enabled the new Government to defray its immediate 
expenses_ But it was faced by the need of raising funds 
for sending a punitive expedition to Edo, which step became 
necessary after the Battle of Fushimi-Toba_ The Council 
of State met on January 7 in order to discuss the problem_ 
The meeting was presided over by Tomomi Iwakura and 
attended by the following officials: Hachiro Mitsuoka, Ichizo 
Okubo (*-,,-lik-il), Hyosuke Hirozawa (l8<i'!!;;:JIIJ), and Shojiro 
Goto (HiliH>=ftll)_ Hirozawa expressed his opinion that a 
fund of 200,000 ryo was required for undertaking the pro-
posed military expedition to the seat of the old government, 
but Mitsuoka argued that at least 3,000,000 ryo was absolutely 
required_ The meeting accepted Mitsuoka's opinion and 
decided to raise it at once_ 
On January 21 the Revenue Office assembled the repre-
sentatives of Mitsui and other houses which were in its 
service and asked them to present a list of the names of 
leading business firms and wealthy citizens in Kyoto, Osaka 
and near by districts_ This instruction was followed by the 
.--,-".--~----.----.------.-. -- --- .. ---.~.----- ------~-.-~ 
22 E. BONJO 
presentation by these firms of three lists of such names. 
The first list included such names in Kyoto and its vicinity; 
the second list contained those of Osaka and of its neigh-
borhood; and the third list contained those of the Province 
of Ohmi. The new Government accordingly invited more 
than 100 merchants of Osaka and Kyoto to the Imperial 
Palace of Nijo on January 29, and asked them for their 
cooperation for raising a fund of 3,000,000 ryo. 
Mitsui-gumi wrote a letter to the Revenue Office under 
date of February 2 regarding the right method of raising 
this fund_ It urged that the only way to overcome the 
difficulty involved was to despatch an official of the Revenue 
Office to Osaka for the purpose of securing the agreement 
of the wealthy citizens of that city as a preliminary step. 
for raising the needed fund. 
This suggestion was accepted and on February 12 
Hachiro Mitsuoka was despatched to Osaka. On the follow-' 
ing day he summoned 15 leading commoners of Osaka 
headed by Zen-emon Konoike (ill\jll!.'1i'1ili~r~). These men were 
instructed to assist the Revenue Office in raising the proposed 
fund and put under the employment of the Revenue Court_ '. 
On February 19 and 20 650 wealthy citizens of Osaka were 
summoned (322 on the first day and 328 on the second day) 
and were instructed to assist the new Government in its 
attempt to raise the fund. 
This fund (goyokin) the Revenue Office tried to raise 
was really a domestic loan redeemable through the tax on 
land. When the Emperor's visit to Osaka as a preliminary 
step for sending a punitive expedition to Edo was decided 
on February 3, a fund of 50,000 ryo each was raised at 
both Kyoto and Osaka to be used as the travelling expense 
of the Imperial visit. The stupendous difficulty the officials 
of the new Government faced in raising the needed furid of 
3,000,000 ryo is described by "kojo-oboegaki " (IJJ:'lNlf) which 
gives an account of the efforts made by the Mitsui-gumi in 
conjunction with the two houses of Ono and Shimada at 
the command of the Government under date of November, 
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1869. It says in part: .. When the Revenue Office tried to 
raise the funds, many expressed their misgivings (as to the 
possibility of redemption) and we had to act as guarantors. 
We have collected the money from the persons whose names 
are given in the list attached. The total amount now 
collected at Kyoto and other places is about 1,300,000 ryo." 
In a report to the Government by Tomomi Iwakura in May 
of the same year, he says: "Recently we tried to raise 
only 3,000,000 ryo and we fail to understand why we have 
not succeeded in raising even half of that amount." It 
appears, however, that even Mitsuoka had not really believed 
that he could raise the amount he proposed; he wanted to 
impress the wealthy merchants with the statement of the 
amount in his wish to. raise as much as possible under the 
circumstances. 
Prior to all this, just before Iwakura set out on his 
journey to Tosando following the decision to send an expedi-
tion against Edo, the Mitsui-gumi was ordered to join his 
suite and two representatives of the firm joined it. They 
were given the full privilege of samurai and proved instru-
mental in raising funds on many occasions on the way. At 
Otsu, they' donated a fund of 10,000 ryo (January 24), 
another 10,000 ryo at Ogaki (February 21); they purchased 
1,000 bales of polished rice after the party had arrived at 
Warabi in Musashi Province (March 13) and stored them 
in the Mitsui warehouse at Fukagawa, Edo (the value being 
1,712 ryo); on April 16 a donation of 25,000 ryo and at 
later date another donation of 10,000 ryo were made to the 
headquarters of the Iwakura expedition. Still another dona-
tion of 30,000 ryo was made after H.I.H. Prince Arisugawa 
(OIiI!!i)!I'g), commander-in-chief of the Expeditionary Army 
arrived at the Zojoji Temple, Shiba, Edo. 
In leap-month April rrlll"lJl) of the Same year, the Govern· 
ment levied a loan of 500,000 ryo among the wealthy merchants 
and trade guilds of Osaka and its vicinity, as the expense 
of sending a superintendant-general to Edo_ Prior to this 
the Imperial Army took over Edo Castle. Although dis-
--- --------~----- -~------- .--------~---­~----
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contented samurai betook themselves to Veno for the purpose 
of resistance, no move was made by the Imperial Army 
because it was under financial privation. It was because of 
this that Sanetomi Sanjo (C'.f!ll1'f!l;) was ordered to go to Edo 
in the capacity of superintendant·general. But there was 
another reason for raising this fund; the Government had 
to purchase a warship. The fund was apportioned as follows: 
100,000 ryo among 15 merchants headed by Konoike who were 
in the service of the Revenue Office; 50,000 ryo among Mitsui, 
Ono and Shimada who were engaged in the exchange busi· 
ness; 344,000 ryo among some 87 guilds of various trades 
such as sake·brewing, pawning, exchange, etc. The mer· 
chants in the service of the Revenue Office actually turned 
in 80,000 ryo and Mitsui and two others paid 40,000 ryo; 
but the amount paid by the various commercial guilds is 
unknown. 
The Government on May 15 issued the so·called Dajokan 
notes (*D'x'1rfL) (Notes of Council of State), but it was unable 
to defray all expenses with these notes. It had to use cash 
in the payment of salaries to the soldiers of the Imperial 
Army in the O·u district where people were not accustomed 
to the use of such paper money, and also in the purchase 
of military weapons from foreign countries. The Govern· 
ment, accordingly, had to depend on Mitsui·gumi in securing 
the needed cash. On May 22, the firm furnished the 
Government with a fund of 50,000 Mexican dollars. Again, 
on August 25, the Government summonsed the representatives 
of Mitsui and other firms in Tokyo to the Imperial Palace 
at Tokyo in order to raise a fund of 860,000 ryo. On this 
occasion, Mitsui, Ono, and Shimada supplied a total of 60,000 
ryo. This loan was redeemed entirely by gold paper notes 
when they were issued in December, 1869. 
3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "GOYOKIN" 
The foregoing account will· be enough to show the 
financial distress under which the Meiji Government laboured 
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in the early years of the new regime. The following table 
indicates the receipts and disbursements of the Government 
















Dajokan notes 24,037,389 23,962,610 
Funds and Domestic Loans 3,838,107 811,000 
Foreign loans 894.375 100,500 
Total Revenue 33,089,313 34,438,404 
Ordinary expenditure 5,500,25:1 9,360,230 
Extraordinaryexpenditure 24,998,832 11,425,609 





















As the above figures show, the extraordinary revenue 
constitutes the greater portion of the total revenue of the 
first period. The same is true to some extent of the second 
period, but just the reverse is the case for the third period. 
The extraordinary revenue during the first period was 
derived from three sources, namely, Dajokan notes, money 
contributed or loaned by citizens, and foreign loans. 
Because of the difficulty of accounting, the Government 
raised or loaned money first from among tae citizens of 
Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo and Otsu and then further 
from those in other parts of the country. The Government 
also commandeered rice stored in the municipal warehouses 
of Tokyo and Yokohama with a promise to pay for it at 
later dates. As to foreign loans, the Government borrowed 
500,000 dollars from the Oriental Bank, a British financial 
house in Yokohama and 400,000 dollars from a British firm. 
Dajokan notes also constitute a greater portion of the extra· 
ordinary revenue during the second period and domestic as 
well as foreign loans are also included. 
The foregoing statistics in the first and second periods 
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in the government finance of the early Meiji years evince 
the fact that the Government found it impossible to cope 
with its financial distress only by depending on financial 
accomodations by the wealthy merchants in Kyoto, Osaka 
etc.-a policy which had been handed down from the 
Shogunate days. Thus, the Government felt the necessity 
of issuing notes and borrowing from foreign sources. In 
other words, the three financial policies of raising funds 
and domestic loans, of seeking the aid of paper money and 
of borrowing foreign capital, were employed in order to 
patch-up the financial problem of the time. I have above 
dwelt chiefly on one of these three policies, namely, the 
policy of raising" goyokin" or forced loans the Government 
raised from wealthY citizens_ Now, it is to be noted that 
" goyokin" during the feudal days was not the same with 
that in the period under our consideration. During the 
Tokugawa Period, "goyokin" and "kenkin" or monetary 
contribution was differentiated only in name, and although 
the redemption of "goyokin" was presupposed, it was not 
actually practised. In some cases, "goyokin" was arbitrarily 
changed into "ken kin " afterwards. Let us now consider 
the nature of "goyokin" as it was raised by the Meiji 
Government. As we have already pointed out, the govern-
ment declaration issued on January 17, the first year of 
Meiji (1868) made it clear that the .. goyokin" raised by 
the Government was to be regarded as loans and would 
not be confiscated. We regret that very little is known now 
of the methods of raising this money and of the conditions 
of it subscription, etc., each time it was raised by the Meiji 
Government_ 
When 3,000,000 ryo was raised as the basic fund of 
the Revenue Office, the tax on land was made security. 
And we know that· the land tax was the only source of 
revenue for the Government at that time. Later, when the 
Government announced its intention to raise money as the 
expense for the Imperial expedition, the assurance was 
given that no subscribers would be placed in a condition of 
,. 
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distress, thereby hinting that the money would be paid back 
at some future date. When another fund was raised as the 
expense of sending a superintendant·general to Edo, the rate 
of interest was specified as 1.5 per cent a month, and the 
Government assured lenders that the money would be paid 
back within October. Thus, the Government promised as 
to the rate of interest as well as the time of redemption. 
The Government fulfilled its promises. It paid a monthly 
interest of one per cent for the Revenue Office fund and 
1.5 per cent for the money which was raised on the occasion 
of the sending of the superintendant·general to Edo. 
Both the principal and interest of the "goyokin" raised 
by the Meiji Government were paid, as the following table 
of figures ind icates : 
1st Period 2nd Period 3rd Period 4th Period Total 
(yen) (yen) (yenl (yen) (yen) 
Fonds raised 3,838,107 811,000 4,649,107 
Funds redeemed 263,293 1,465,301 1,449,318 1,471,193 4,649,104 
Interest paid 197,636 202,724 195,963 84,089 680,412 
The interest paid includes that which was paid on 
foreign loans. The very fact that both principal and interest 
were paid back shows that the "goyokin" raised by the 
Meiji Government during the first few years of its existence 
was radically different from that which was raised under 
the feudal regime. 
It is clear that the funds raised by the Meiji Government 
were used mostly for political and military affairs during 
the turbulent period immediately following the Meiji Restora· 
tion. But even the wealthy citizens of that time had no 
magic box from which they could produce as much money 
as they wished. Many of them were unable to raise the 
amount specified by the Government. Take the Mitsui case, 
for instance, That firm was commanded to turn in 50,000 
ryo in cash and in a lump sum on August 25, 1868, at 
Tokyo. The firm paid 20,000 ryo immediately and promised 
to pay 10,000 ryo more in the following month, but the 
'Government allowed no delay and demanded the immediate 
, 
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payment of the remainder. There was no other way than 
to submit to the order, and Mitsui han to seII gold and 
silver wares it had kept in its safe in order to raise the 
necessary amount of money. Merchants in Osaka also faced 
similar distress. Mitsui's report to the Revenue Office 
stated that some of the weII-known merchants in Osaka had 
closed their doors and discontinued business_ A statement 
issued by a drug dealers' guild pointed out the dire effects 
of the Government's attempt to raise money on its members 
who were forced to financial embarrassment thereby. Thus, 
it was impossible for wealthy merchans to comply with the 
Government's demand to the latter's complete satisfaction_ 
The Government felt the obvious necessity of altering its 
financial policy_ Thus, there appeared the policy of issuing 
the so-caIIed Dajokan notes, promulgated on leap-month 
April 19. 
As these notes were inconvertible, they failed to circulate 
smoothly, and the Government had to issue decrees several 
times urging their circulation. (For instance, on July 18, 
1868 and July 23 the same year)_ Various other methods 
were employed in order to facilitate the circulation of the 
notes. Later, the Government established the Commercial 
Office (Shohoshi) which loaned out Dajokan notes to daimyos 
and merchants in Kyoto Osaka etc., as industrial funds. In 
Osaka, the notes were given to those who possessed the 
certificates of subscription to " goyokin "_ As the" goyokin " 
coIIected under the feudal regime was not paid back, mer-
chants of Osaka thought it much safer to take the notes 
and they eagerly accepted them_ Thus, they received these 
notes with the certificates of the funds they had paid on 
various occasions as securities. As the rate of interest on 
the Revenue Office funds was one per cent per month and 
the merchants had to pay an interest of 0_6 per cent per 
month, what the Government did amounted to the issuance 
of bearer certificates at the interest rate of 0.4 per cent per 
month. But the ·rate of interest on the notes was not 
uniform. In the case of the fund raised for the purpose of 
~---------.- -~-~.-~-----~-.--.. -.. . .. ~.-.. ~-~.-'---.-.'" --
r 
"GOYOKIN" AND THE MEI]I RESTRATION 29 
sending a superintendant·general to Edo, the rate was one 
per cent per month instead of 0.6 per cent in other cases. 
This is because of the fact that the interest rate on that 
particular fund was 1.5 per cent per month. In consequence, 
in this case the Government's action amounted to the 
transfer to the merchants of bearer certificates at the in· 
terest rate of 0.5 per cent per month. 
Let us next consider how the funds were paid back. 
The Osaka Prefectural Government issued the following 
notification on October 20, 1869: 
"The Government since last spring has on several 
occasions raised funds to be used for military campaigns. 
The money so raised will be eventually repaid in due course 
of time. The Government is ready to repay in cash the 
loans it raised when it purchased the steel warship on 
which Lord Sanjo was despatched to Tokyo in April. 
Creditors are hereby asked to present themselves at the 
Finance Department on the 24th instant to get repayment. 
Those having received notes for the loan certificates shall 
return them to the Finance Department to receive the cash 
payment ". 
Again, on November 28, the following notification was 
issued by the same Prefectural Government: 
"Both the principal and interest of the loans raised in 
the three cities shall be repaid to the creditors after the 
end of November. The creditors shall present themselves 
to the Finance Department to get repayment. As cash and 
notes have equal value, the payment will be paid in either 
of them. Those wishing to receive cash shall return the 
notes they received from the Government in exchange for 
loan certificates." 
We may assume then that the loans were repaid by the 
Government. As the creditors had received the notes in 
exchange for their loan certificates as a rule, they must 
have received cash by presenting the notes to the Finance 
Department. In case the presentation of a great sum of notes 
was impracticable, the amount representing the difference 
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between the loans (goyokin) and the notes was repaid, we 
presume, by the Government. In other words, the loans were 
redeemed in notes issued by the Government. There is an 
historical record showing that the loan of 50,000 dollars and 
the loan of 60,000 ryo accommodated by Mitsui and others, 
were all redeemed in notes. We may summarise the policy 
of loan redemption by the Government as follows: the 
Government insisted on the delivery of notes the same as 
bond certificates. Then, taking advantage of the great 
difficulty of their delivery, the Government settled the debts 
by paying the difference between the loans and notes. The 
Government adopted the rate of 120 ryo in notes for every 
100 ryo of gold in the settlement of the loans incurred in 
the second year of Meiji. 
We have seen that the Government was able to secure 
revenue in the early part of Meiji years through Mitsui and 
other wealthy families of the time. Under the old regime, 
the daimyos entertained before wealthy merchants, offered 
them social positions and treated them the same as samurai, 
in return for the financial assistance then rendered. The 
Meiji Government also made similar ·recompenses to Mitsui, 
Konoike and other wealthy merchants for the financial help 
they had given. There is no doubt, of course, that loyalty 
was the motive of their act; they could not stand seeing 
the financial distress of the struggling Government and 
offered their helping hands in coping with the financial 
exigencies of the time. However, the fact remains that the 
new Government succeeded in securing the financial help 
of these merchants and in carrying out its work of over· 
throwing the feudal regime, because it could attract these 
merchants by the slogan of loyalty to the Imperial Court. 
Osaka was the financial centre of Japan during the 
feudal period and the Shogunate Government often levied 
" goyokin" on the wealthy merchants of the city. There 
were such instances of requisitioning funds dUring the closing 
years of the period. When the critical stage of the Shogunate 
regime was reached, both the authorities of the Edo Govern· 
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ment as well those of the new Government cast coquettish 
glances towards Osaka. When the new Government sum-
moned the wealthy merchants of Osaka on December 29, 
the third year of Keio (1867) to present themselves at Kyoto, 
they failed to present themselves under one pretext or 
another. But on January 7 Shogun Keiki returned to Edo 
on board the Kaiyo Maru and on January 10 H.I.H. Prince 
Yoshiakira (~~;II!:E) went to Osaka in the capacity of the 
commander-in-chief of the Imperial Expeditionary Force. 
This was followed by the Imperial visit of the Emperor 
Meiji to Osaka and the city was placed under the control 
of the Imperial Court. The firm establishment of the new 
Government was greatly aided by the financial aia thus 
rendered by the wealthy commoners of Osaka and other 
cities. This financial co-operation was made by few wealthy. 
citizens at times, but it was rather necessary to secure 
money from many citizens. We have alreadY stated that 
the Government summoned 650 commoners of Osaka when 
it tried to raise three million ryo as the fund of the Revenue 
Office. There is no way of knowing the exact number of 
the merchants who made contributions, but the following 
figures taken from the Osaka Section of the Government 
Revenue Ledger will indicate the general outline of the 
loans: 
Loans No. of Creditors Amount 
(ryoJ Iryo) 
10,000 and above 1 50.000 
Between 5,000 and 10,000 5 32.593 
Between 1,000 and 5,000 76 149.800 
Between 500 and 1.000 84 55.102 
Between 450 and 500 17 7.294 
Between 400 and 450 26 10.865 
Between 350 and 400 38 13.316 
Between 300 and 350 67 20.986 
Between 250 and 300 48 12.803 
Between 200 and 250 95 19.969 
Between 150 and 200 176 28.452 
Between 100 and 150 354 41.232 
Between 50 and 100 552 35.073 





The loans accomodated by various guilds: 
10,000 and above 2 
Between 1,000 and 10,000 29 
Between 500 and 1,000 30 
Between 100 and 500 72 










The foregoing figures regarding the individuals' burden 
of loans indicate that the number of the persons who con-
tributed 500 ryo or more each, constitute 60 per cent of 
the total amount; but the number of persons who contributed 
less than 150 ryo each constitute 73 per cent of the total 
nuniber of persons. This shows how comparatively small 
amounts were raised from among a large number of coni-
moners. 
It was on occasion of despatching the Superintendent-
General to Edo in leap-month April that an enormous burden 
was imposed on the various guids; but the foregoing figures 
show that the guilds also shared the burden of raising the 
Revenue Office funds. 
The same is true of the raising of the Revenue Office 
funds in the city of Sakai, as the fonowing figures indicate: 
Loans No. of Creditors Amount 
(ryo) (ryo) 
1,000 and above 2 2,300 
Between 500 and 1,000 2 1,450 
Between 400 and 500 2 960 
Between 300 and 400 2 740 
Between 200 and 300 6 1,265 
Between 100 and 200 34 4,510 
Between 50 and 100 48 3,060 
Between 30 and 50 57 1,948 
Between 20 and 30 53 1,175 
Between 10 and 20 372 4,115 
Total 578 21,523 
Sake brewers' guild in Saikai 1,400 
Sake brewers' guild in Kishiwada 125 
... 
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The number of those contributed less than 100 ryo, 
especially those whose amounts were 10 or 20 ryo, is very 
large. This is additional evidence of the fact that the 
money was raised from many people in small amounts. 
When the Emperor Meiji's expedition to Osaka was 
decided, a sum of 50,000 ryo was raised from Kyoto and 
Osaka each. Although a few wealthy persons played a 
prominent role in the raising of this money, many others 
in Osaka, Sakai, Nishinomiya, Itami and other points in the 
old province of Settsu made contributions in various amounts. 
The money is subdivided as follows: 














There are also many cases in which a number of persons jointly 
contributed, their number sometimes being several scores. A group of 
persons numbering 893 made a contribution of 84,035 ryo, the average 
amount per person being little over 94 ryo. 
As the above table shows the number of individuals 
who contributed. less than 100 ryo and only four and the 
total amount is comparatively large. But if we think of 
adding the case of contributions made by groups of indio 
viduals, the total number of persons is 965 and they raised 
a total sum of 167,000 ryo. This is another proof of the 
undeniable fact that the raising of the funds was participated 
in by many instead of few. 
We have already seen that the Government no longer 
could raise funds through forced loans and had to resort to 
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the policy of issuing Dajokan notes which was regarded 
as similar to bond certificates. In a debate held among an 
official council in March, the second year of Meiji, arguments 
pro and con were advanced regarding the proposed abolition 
of the system of "goyokin". The council decided in favour 
of its abolition in April of the same year and addressed a 
memorial to the Throne in favor of the replacement of 
goyokin by a system of government loans. The memorial 
was accompanied by the following recommendations: 
" As we have decided to abolish goyokin and establish 
a system of government loans, we recommend that a1l· in-
dispensable government expenditure be met by floating loans, 
that all goyokin which have been levied on landlords and 
merchants since the Restoration be turned into government 
loans without delay; and that the interest on the loans be 
paid at the request of the bondholders." 
However, as the grant of Dajokan notes was made in 
order to carry out the same function as government loans, 
one may say that the idea contained in the above memorial 
to the Throne had been carried out before the presentation 
of the memorial. 
It was the samurai of the lower ranks who actually 
carried out the political reformation of the Meiji Restoration, 
and there is no denying that the activities of commoners 
participated in the same movement were characterised by 
passivity. But would the establishment of the Meiii Govern-
ment have been possible without the financial assistance of 
commoners? We gravely doubt such a possibility. The 
accomplishment of the Restoration was possible because the 
Meiji Government could raise forced loans from wealthy 
commoners and then issue paper money. For this reason, 
the efforts made by the commoners in the Restoration 
movement cannot be lightly regarded, although they appear 
to have been passive. Moreover, although few commoners 
played the role of leadership, a large number of commoners 
also participated in the movement and its final success was 
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that the power of the many rather than of the few brought 
about the Restoration and gave it their support. 
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